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Abstract 
This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who 
has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 
23 countries (counting Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We 
also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very 
large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people 
as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking. 
 
1. Introduction 
In a Gettier case, an agent forms a justified true belief that, according to most 
philosophers, falls short of being an instance of knowledge (Gettier, 1963). Following the 
tradition, we will call the judgment that the agent does not have knowledge despite 
having a justified true belief “the Gettier intuition.” Gettier concluded that the 
philosophical tradition had been wrong in identifying knowledge with justified true belief 
(but see Antognazza, 2015; Dutant, 2015 on whether the justified true belief analysis of 
knowledge has ever been part of the philosophical tradition).2 Agreeing by and large with 
                                                        
2 See also Alai, 2015 for further discussion. 
 10 
his conclusion (but see Sartwell, 1991; Weatherson, 2003), philosophers have attempted 
to reformulate the analysis of knowledge in response to the cases Gettier put forward. 
Unfortunately, each proposal has been itself undermined by further counterexamples (for 
an early review, see Shope, 1983).  
 This sprawling literature was rejuvenated when experimental philosophers and 
then psychologists started examining whether lay people possess the Gettier intuition.3 In 
a groundbreaking, influential article, Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) reported 
evidence that the Gettier intuition varies across cultures, and they argued that if true, such 
cross-cultural variation would undermine important projects in epistemology. More 
recent work has however cast doubt on the reality of the alleged cultural variation. In 
particular, Machery, Stich, Rose, Chatterjee, Karasawa, Struchiner, Sirker, Usui, and 
Hashimoto (forthcoming a) have examined whether the Gettier intuition differs across 
populations in the USA, Japan, Brazil, and India (see also Kim & Yuan, 2015), and they 
have provided evidence that, for at least some ways of eliciting the Gettier intuition, 
Americans, Japanese, Brazilians, and Indians share the Gettier intuition (Figure 1). 
                                                        
3 Starmans & Friedman, 2012; Turri, Buckwalter, & Blouw, 2015; Machery, Stich, Rose, 
Chatterjee, Karasawa, Struchiner, Sirker, Usui, & Hashimoto, forthcoming b. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of knowledge denials for two Gettier cases, a clear knowledge case, 
and a false belief case in the USA, Japan, Brazil, and India (based on Machery et al., 
forthcoming a) 
 Machery and colleagues concluded that the Gettier intuition may well be part of a 
core epistemology, a universal way of thinking about epistemic matters: In all cultures, 
the standard translations of “knowledge” refer to an epistemic state that differs from the 
mere possession of a justified true belief. They also warned philosophers not to interpret 
these results as showing that the concept of knowledge is universal: People may think of 
the epistemic state referred to by the standard translations of “knowledge” differently in 
different cultures and languages. Finally, they called for further inquiries into folk 
epistemology, aimed at identifying the aspects of folk epistemology that vary across 
cultures and languages and those that are invariant (see Mizumoto, Stich, and McCready, 
forthcoming for relevant articles).  
   We now think Machery and colleagues’ claim about a core epistemology may 
have been premature. After all, Machery et al. (forthcoming a) presented data from only 4 
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cultures and languages, which leaves plenty of room for surprising cross-cultural and 
cross-linguistic variation. In addition, while these four societies are quite different and 
while English, Portuguese, Bengali, and Japanese differ in many respects, the USA, 
Japan, India, and Brazil are large, industrial societies with a market economy, and the 
Machery et al. (forthcoming a) results may not generalize to other societies, including 
small-scale societies. Finally, those data came partly from students, and it is unclear 
whether the findings would generalize to other populations. One of our goals in the 
present article is thus to extend the results of Machery et al. (forthcoming a) by looking at 
a much larger range of cultures and languages.  
 In addition, previous work by Machery et al. (forthcoming a) on the Gettier cases 
did not examine whether demographic factors predict the Gettier intuition beyond culture 
and language, including gender, people’s reflective tendencies, and personality. It is 
controversial whether gender has an effect on the judgments elicited by philosophical 
cases (Buckwalter & Stich, 2014; Adleberg, Thompson, & Nahmias, 2015; 
Seyedsayamdost, 2015; Holtzman, 2016), in particular on the Gettier intuition. Early 
work suggested it does, but the gender effect on the Gettier intuition has been difficult to 
replicate. In the present article, we will examine the role of gender with a very large 
sample size. Some have also argued that personality influences the judgments elicited by 
philosophical cases (Feltz and Cokely, 2009, 2012, 2013), but the evidence bearing on 
this claim is limited. Our data will allow us to look at this question. Finally, some critics 
of experimental philosophy have highlighted the distinction between “reflective” and 
“non-reflective” judgments, but previous work has not supported the idea that reflection 
changes the judgments people make in response to cases (Weinberg, Alexander, 
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Gonnerman, and Reuter, 2012; Colaço, Kneer, Alexander, & Machery, ms). We will 
examine this question as well in this article.  
 Here is how we will proceed. Section 2 presents our empirical research and 
Section 3 discusses its significance for epistemology as well as for the empirical study of 
core epistemology. 
 
2. Empirical Findings 
2.1 Materials 
Participants were presented with the following Gettier case:  
Paul Jones was worried because it was 10 pm and his wife Mary was not home 
from work yet. Usually she is home by 6 pm. He tried her cell phone but just kept 
getting her voicemail. Starting to worry that something might have happened to 
her, he decided to call some local hospitals to ask whether any patient by the 
name of “Mary Jones” had been admitted that evening. At the University 
Hospital, the person who answered his call confirmed that someone by that name 
had been admitted with major but not life-threatening injuries following a car 
crash. Paul grabbed his coat and rushed out to drive to University Hospital. As it 
turned out, the patient at University Hospital was not Paul’s wife, but another 
woman with the same name. In fact, Paul’s wife had a heart attack as she was 
leaving work, and was actually receiving treatment in Metropolitan Hospital, a 
few miles away. 
This Gettier case was followed by four questions in a fixed order. The first question was 
a comprehension question: 
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According to the story, which of the following statements is correct?   
(1) At 10 pm Paul’s wife was in a hospital 
(2) At 10 pm Paul’s wife was in a movie theater 
Participants who selected (2) were excluded from analyses. 
 This comprehension question was then followed by two different questions 
intended to examine whether participants shared the Gettier intuition (which we 
respectively call “Knowledge 1” and “Knowledge 2”): 
(Knowledge 1) In your personal opinion, when Paul rushed out to drive to 
University Hospital, did he know whether or not his wife was hospitalized? 
(1) Yes, he knew 
(2) No, he did not know 
(Knowledge 2) In your personal opinion, which of the following sentences better 
describes Paul’s situation? 
(1) When Paul rushed out to drive to University Hospital, he knew that his wife 
was hospitalized. 
(2) When Paul rushed out to drive to University Hospital, he thought he knew that 
his wife was hospitalized, but he did not actually know this. 
Participants who selected (2) to Knowledge 1 were scored as sharing the Gettier intuition 
when answers to Knowledge 1 were analyzed. Participants who selected (2) to 
Knowledge 2 were scored as sharing the Gettier intuition when answers to Knowledge 2 
were analyzed. 
 Knowledge 1 and Knowledge 2 were each followed by a question meant to probe 
participants’ certainty: 
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How certain are you of your response on a (0-100)% scale, with low numbers 
indicating that you are not sure and high numbers indicating that you are sure? 
I am _______ % certain of my response.4 
 Finally, between Knowledge 1 and Knowledge 2, participants were asked a 
question about the protagonist’s justification: 
In your personal opinion, how justified was Paul in thinking that his wife was 
hospitalized when he rushed out to drive to University Hospital? 
(1) Completely unjustified 
(2) Unjustified  
(3) Somewhat unjustified 
(4) Neutral 
(5) Somewhat justified 
(6) Justified  
(7) Completely justified  
Participants who selected (1), (2), and (3) were excluded from analyses (see Section 2.2 
for explanation).  
 The Gettier case is an adaptation of a case found in Nagel et al. (2012), and has 
been used in previous cross-cultural studies (Machery et al., forthcoming a, forthcoming 
b). The questions used in the present study are identical to the questions used in Machery 
et al. (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) and Rose et al. (forthcoming), which are themselves 
adaptations of the questions used in Nagel et al. (2012). Because “to know” is sometimes 
                                                        
4 In Colombia, the 100-point confidence scales for Knowledge 1 and Knowledge 2 were 
replaced with 7-point scales. 
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used to mean “believe with certainty,” answers to Knowledge 1 may not genuinely reflect 
people’s judgments about knowledge. Knowledge 2 is meant to control for this 
possibility by contrasting the subjective certainty of the agent with his genuine 
knowledge. While Nagel et al. (2012) presented Knowledge 2 only when participants 
answered “know” to Knowledge 1, all our participants saw both questions about 
knowledge (for discussion of the limits of Nagel et al.’s methods, see Starmans & 
Friedman, 2013).  
 The Gettier case was the first case of a survey containing four other philosophical 
cases (in a fixed order) and the Asian disease case (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), 
followed by 5 social-psychology scales: The Cognitive Reflection test or CRT (Frederick, 
2005), our own adapted version of the Disjunctive Thinking Test (Shafir, 1994), the 18-
item Need for Cognition Scale or NFC (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984)5, the 12-item 
Personal Need for Structure Scale or NFS (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 
2001), and the 10-item Personality Inventory or TIPI (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 
2003). Results were coded according to the standard coding schemes for these social-
psychological scales. A demographic questionnaire concluded the survey. None of the 
philosophical cases following the Gettier case in the survey was epistemological.  
 
2.2 Participants 
We collected data from 2838 participants in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting 
Hong-Kong as a distinct country) and 17 languages. Some participants were recruited on 
                                                        
5 In Korea the 18-item NFC scale was replaced with the standardized 15-item NFC scale 
in Korean (Kim, 2007).  
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the web, others by means of data collection companies, yet others in universities. Some 
participants received a small fiduciary compensation, some received course credits in 
exchange for participation, others were volunteers. Some participants completed paper-
and-pencil versions of the survey, others were read the survey, yet others completed web-
based surveys.  
 We excluded data from participants who were younger than 18 years old, did not 
answer the comprehension question (see below), or did not answer it correctly. Because 
we are interested only in the answers of participants who take the belief of the protagonist 
in the vignette to be justified, we excluded participants who gave an answer lower than 4 
to the justification question. Our final sample consisted of 2230 respondents (46.0% 
males; mean age: 31.7; age SD=14.2; age range: 18-88). 
 Table 1 indicates the country in which the data were collected and presents the 
data collection characteristics for each sample. In some countries, several samples were 
collected either because several research groups were involved (e.g., China) or because 
we sampled from different demographic groups (e.g., Lithuania). The column “Method” 
indicates how the survey was given: Surveys were either completed on the web, 
presented on paper, or read. The column “Payment” indicates whether participants 
received a compensation for participation. Participants who received compensation 
received either some money or school credits. 
 
Sample Students Method Payment Language N 
Europe      
Bulgaria Both Web- Volunteers Bulgarian 155 
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based 
France N Web-
based 
Compensation 
& volunteers 
French 178 
Germany N Web-
based 
Compensation German 88 
Italy Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Italian 90 
Lithuania Both Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Lithuanian 154 
Portugal Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Portuguese 73 
Spain N Web-
based 
Compensation Spanish 116 
Switzerland Y Paper-
pencil 
& web-
based 
Compensation 
& volunteers 
French 26 
UK N Web-
based 
Compensation English 120 
      
Middle East      
Iran N Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Persian 90 
 19 
Israel 
(Bedouins) 
N Paper-
pencil 
Compensation Arabic 21 
Israel (Jews) Y Web-
based 
Volunteers Hebrew 70 
Lebanon Y Web-
based 
Compensation  English 75 
      
Central & 
North 
America 
     
Mexico N Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Spanish 64 
USA N Web-
based 
Compensation English 116 
      
South 
America 
     
Brazil Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Portuguese 61 
Colombia N Read  Compensation Spanish 50 
      
Asia      
China Both Paper- Volunteers Chinese, 196 
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pencil 
and 
web-
based 
and 
Compensation 
Simplified 
and 
Traditional 
Hong Kong Y Web-
based 
Compensation Chinese, 
Traditional 
72 
India Y Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Bengali 86 
Indonesia Y Paper-
pencil 
Compensation Indonesian 73 
Japan N Paper-
pencil 
& web-
based 
Compensation Japanese 146 
Mongolia N Paper-
pencil 
Volunteers Mongolian 33 
South Korea N Web-
based 
Compensation Korean 73 
Table 1: Data collection characteristics across cultures 
 
2.3 Results 
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A logistic regression was first conducted to assess whether site, gender, age, CRT scores, 
NFC scores, NFS scores, and the five dimensions of personality (extraversion6, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism7, and openness to experience) predicted 
whether or not people answer “does not know” to Knowledge 1. When all 11 variables 
are entered simultaneously, they significantly predict whether or not people choose “Does 
not know” over “Knows” in response to Knowledge 1, χ2(36, N=2033)=197.13, p<.000 
(Nagelkerke’s R2=.123). Table 2 presents the relevant statistics for all these variables. 
 
Variable β SE p Odds ratio Odds ratio 
95% CI 
Age .01 .01 .29 1.01 [.996, 1.01] 
Gendera .00 .10 .99 1.00 [.83, 1.21] 
      
Europe      
Bulgariab .28 .24 .24 1.33 [.83, 2.12] 
Germanyb .50 .29 .09 1.64 [.92, 2.92] 
Italyb -.42 .31 .17 .66 [.36, 1.19] 
                                                        
6 While our scale ranged from 1 to 7, the data from Germany ranged from 1 to 8. We do 
not know where the disagreement comes from. Assuming a coding error, we decided to 
transform the 8’s into 7’s.  
7 TIPI codes for emotional stability, the inverse of neuroticism. So high scores 
correspond to a low neuroticism.  
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Lithuaniab .68 .25 .007 1.98 [1.21, 3.25] 
Portugalb 1.30 .33 <.001 3.67 [1.93, 7.00] 
Spainb .47 .29 .08 1.60 [.95, 2.70] 
Switzerlandb .20 .44 .65 1.23 [.51, 2.92] 
UKb 1.3 .28 <.001 3.72 [2.13, 6.48] 
North America      
Mexicob .78 .33 .02 2.38 [1.15, 4.91] 
USAb .86 .28 .002 2.36 [1.38, 4.06] 
South America      
Brazilb 1.51 .34 <.001 4.51 [2.31, 8.80] 
Colombiab .88 .34 .01 2.42 [1.24, 4.72] 
Middle East      
Iranb -.14 .29 .63 .87 [.50, 1.53] 
Israel (Bedouins)b -1.61 1.06 .13 .20 [.03, 1.60] 
Israel (Jews) b .90 .33 .006 2.45 [1.30, 4.63] 
Lebanonb -.20 .32 .53 .82 [.44, 1.52] 
Asia      
Chinab 1.26 .26 <.001 3.53 [2.13, 5.84] 
Hong Kongb .88 .34 .01 2.42 [1.24, 4.72] 
Indiab .26 .34 .43 1.30 [.68, 2.45] 
Indonesiab .64 .32 .05 1.90 [1.01, 3.56] 
Japanb .59 .25 .02 1.81 [1.10, 2.98] 
Mongoliab 1.10 .45 .01 3.02 [1.25, 7.26] 
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South Koreab 1.35 .32 <.001 3.86 [2.07, 7.21] 
      
Disjunctive thinkingc .02 .11 .85 1.02 [.83, 1.26] 
CRT (=1)d .25 .13 .06 1.23 [.995,1.66] 
CRT (=2) d .60 .15 <.001 1.82 [1.37,2.42] 
CRT (=3) d .71 .15 <.001 2.03 [1.51, 2.72] 
NFC .06 .10 .55 1.06 [.88,1.27] 
NFS -.003 .01 .67 1.00 [.98,1.01] 
Extraversion -.07 .04 .06 .93 [.87,1.00] 
Agreeableness -.01 .05 .86 .99 [.91, 1.09] 
Conscientiousness -.11 .05 .01 .89 [.82, .97] 
Emotional stability -.05 .04 .23 .95 [.88, 1.03] 
Openness to experience .10 .05 .04 1.11 [1.01, 1.22] 
Table 2: Logistic regression results for Knowledge 1 (a: reference class – males; b: 
reference class - France; c: reference class – correct answer; d: reference class - CRT 
score = 0) 
Of the variables introduced in the regression model, site, CRT, and conscientiousness 
significantly predict people’s answers to Knowledge 1. Compared to the answers given in 
France, people in 15 countries are more likely to share the Gettier intuition: Germany, 
Lithuania, Portugal, UK, Mexico, USA, Brazil, Colombia, Israel (Jewish people), China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Mongolia, and South Korea. Compared to participants 
with a CRT score equal to 0, people with a CRT score equal to 2 and 3 are more likely to 
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share the Gettier intuition. Finally, conscientious people are less likely to share the 
Gettier intuition.  
 The same procedure was conducted for Knowledge 2. When all 11 variables are 
entered simultaneously, they significantly predict whether or not people choose “thinks 
he knows, but does not actually know” over “knows” in response to Knowledge 2, χ2(36, 
N=2028)=229.06, p<.000 (Nagelkerke’s R2=.169). Table 3 presents the relevant statistics 
for all these variables. 
Variable β SE p Odds 
ratio 
Odds ratio 
95% CI 
Age -.01 .005 .04 .99 [.98, .999] 
Gendera .13 .12 .29 1.14 [.89,1.45] 
      
Europe      
Bulgariab .67 .29 .02 1.95 [1.11, 3.44] 
Germanyb .86 .35 .01 2.35 [1.18, 2.48] 
Italyb .57 .38 .13 1.77 [.84, 3.70] 
Lithuaniab 1.14 .33 .001 3.12 [1.63, 5.96] 
Portugalb 1.68 .49 .001 5.38 [2.06, 
14.04] 
Spainb .34 .29 .25 1.40 [.79, 2.48] 
Switzerlandb .18 .53 .73 1.20 [.43, 3.40] 
UKb 1.26 .33 <.001 3.54 [1.83, 6.84] 
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North America      
Mexicob .27 .39 .48 1.31 [.62, 2.79] 
USAb 1.38 .39 <.001 3.98 [1.84, 8.59] 
South America      
Brazilb 1.25 .44 .005 3.48 [1.46, 8.26] 
Colombiab .88 .43 .04 2.42 [1.04, 5.62] 
Middle East      
Iranb -.20 .31 .53 .82 [.44, 1.52] 
Israel (Bedouins)b -1.81 .81 .03 .16 [.03, .80] 
Israel (Jews) b .52 .40 .20 1.68 [.76, 3.71] 
Lebanonb -.23 .35 .51 .80 [.40,1.58] 
Asia      
Chinab 1.77 .41 <.001 5.86 [2.64, 
13.04] 
Hong Kongb .72 .45 .11 2.06 [.85, 5.01] 
Indiab -.34 .37 .36 .71 [.34, 1.47] 
Indonesiab .30 .36 .41 1.35 [.66, 2.74] 
Japanb .13 .29 .66 1.14 [.65, 2.01] 
Mongoliab 2.12 .78 .007 8.32 [1.80, 
38.51] 
South Koreab 1.51 .43 <.001 4.51 [1.95, 
10.45] 
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Disjunctive thinkingc .07 .14 .63 1.07 [.81, 1.41] 
CRT (=1)d .46 .16 .003 1.58 [1.17, 2.15] 
CRT (=2)d 1.05 .19 <.001 2.86 [1.97, 4.15] 
CRT (=3)d 1.01 .20 <.001 2.73 [1.85, 4.04] 
NFC .24 .12 .04 1.27 [1.01, 1.61] 
NFS -.00 .01 .85 .998 [.98, 1.02] 
Extraversion -.10 .05 .03 .91 [.83, .99] 
Agreeableness .09 .06 .14 1.09 [.97, 1.23] 
Conscientiousness -.13 .06 .03 .88 [.78, .99] 
Emotional Stability -.18 .05 <.01 .83 [.75, .92] 
Openness to experience .14 .06 .02 1.15 [1.02, 1.30] 
Table 3: Logistic regression results for Knowledge 2 (a: reference class – males; b: 
reference class - France; c: reference class – correct answer; d: reference class - CRT 
score = 0) 
 Of the variables introduced in the regression model, age, site, CRT, NFC, 
extraversion, emotional stability, openness to experience, and conscientiousness 
significantly predict people’s answers to Knowledge 2. Compared to the answers given in 
France, people in 11 countries were more likely to share the Gettier intuition: Bulgaria, 
Germany, Lithuania, Portugal, UK, USA, Brazil, Colombia, China, Mongolia, and South 
Korea; Bedouins from Israel were significantly less likely to share the Gettier intuition. 
Compared to people with a CRT score equal to 0, people with a CRT score equal to 1, 2, 
and 3 are more likely to share the Gettier intuition. Finally, conscientious and extravert 
people are less likely to share the Gettier intuition, while people open to experience and 
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neurotic people (see footnote 3 on emotional stability and neuroticism in TIPI) are more 
likely to share the Gettier intuition.  
 To control for the influence of uncertain answers, we reproduced these two 
analyses with participants who reported a degree of confidence higher than 66% on the 0-
100 confidence scale after Knowledge 1 or after Knowledge 2 (or higher or equal to 5 on 
the 7-point scales used in Colombia). When all 11 variables are entered simultaneously, 
they significantly predict whether or not people choose “Does not know” over “Know” in 
response to Knowledge 1, χ2(36, N=1510)=192.78, p<.000 (Nagelkerke’s R2=.160). 
Table 4 presents the relevant statistics for all these variables. 
 
Variable β SE p Odds 
ratio 
Odds ratio 
95% CI 
Age .008 .01 .14 1.01 [.998, 1.02] 
Gendera .04 .11 .74 1.04 [.83,1.30] 
      
Europe      
Bulgariab .01 .29 .99 1.01 [.57, 1.77] 
Germanyb .55 .33 .10 1.73 [.90, 3.32] 
Italyb -.15 .36 .68 .86 [.42, 1.76] 
Lithuaniab .93 .29 .001 2.54 [1.45, 4.45] 
Portugalb 1.16 .41 .005 3.19 [1.42, 7.18] 
Spainb .41 .31 .19 1.50 [.82, 2.76] 
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Switzerlandb .37 .56 .50 1.45 [.49, 3.73] 
UKb 1.44 .32 <.001 4.22 [2.26, 7.88] 
North America      
Mexicob .88 .38 .02 2.41 [1.14, 5.09] 
USAb 1.09 .32 .001 2.99 [1.60, 5.56] 
South America      
Brazilb 1.98 .42 <.001 7.23 [3.15, 
16.58] 
Colombiab 1.10 .42 .009 2.99 [1.31, 6.84] 
Middle East      
Iranb -.35 .35 .32 .70 [.35, 1.40] 
Israel (Bedouins)b -1.44 1.07 .18 .24 [.03, 1.94] 
Israel (Jews)b 1.06 .40 .008 2.89 [1.32, 6.29] 
Lebanonb -.40 .39 .31 .67 [.31, 1.44] 
Asia      
Chinab 1.32 .29 <.001 3.74 [2.11, 6.64] 
Hong Kongb .72 .40 .07 2.06 [.94, 4.48] 
Indiab .54 .40 .17 1.71 [.79, 3.71] 
Indonesiab .58 .37 .12 1.79 [.86, 3.73] 
Japanb .53 .30 .08 1.69 [.94, 3.06] 
Mongoliab 1.27 .47 .007 3.54 [1.42, 8.87] 
South Koreab 1.30 .36 <.001 3.67 [1.81, 7.47] 
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Disjunctive thinkingc .04 .13 .73 1.05 [.81, 1.35] 
CRT (=1)d .25 .15 .10 1.29 [.95, 1.75] 
CRT (=2) d .66 .17 <.001 1.93 [1.37, 2.70] 
CRT (=3) d .64 .18 <.001 1.89 [1.33, 2.67] 
NFC .13 .11 .24 1.14 [.92, 1.42] 
NFS -.01 .01 .34 .99 [.97, 1.01] 
Extraversion -.05 .04 .22 .95 [.88, 1.03] 
Agreeableness -.09 .06 .11 .92 [.82, 1.02] 
Conscientiousness -.18 .05 .001 .84 [.75, .93] 
Emotional stability .003 .05 .95 1.00 [.92, 1.10] 
Openness to experience .11 .06 .06 1.12 [.997, 1.26] 
Table 4: Logistic regression results for Knowledge 1 for confidence ≥ 66 (a: reference 
class – males; b: reference class - France; c: reference class – correct answer; d: reference 
class - CRT score = 0) 
 
 Of the variables introduced in the regression model, site, CRT, NFC, and 
conscientiousness significantly predict people’s answers to Knowledge 1. Compared to 
the answers given in France, people in 12 countries are more likely to share the Gettier 
intuition: Lithuania, Portugal, UK, Mexico, USA, Brazil, Colombia, Israel (Jewish 
people), China, Japan, Mongolia, and South Korea. Compared to people with a CRT 
score equal to 0, people with a CRT score equal to 2 and 3 are more likely to share the 
Gettier intuition. Finally, conscientious people are less likely to share the Gettier 
intuition. These results are very similar to those obtained with all participants. 
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 When all 11 variables are entered simultaneously, they significantly predict 
whether or not people choose “Thinks he knows, but does not actually know” over 
“Knows” in response to Knowledge 2, χ2(36, N=1742)=205.85., p<.000 (Nagelkerke’s 
R2=.179). Table 5 presents the relevant statistics for all these variables. 
 
Variable β SE p Odds ratio Odds ratio 
95% CI 
Age -.01 .01 .03 .99 [.98, .999] 
Gendera .11 .14 .40 1.12 [.86,1.46] 
      
Europe      
Bulgariab .72 .31 .02 2.05 [1.11, 3.78] 
Germanyb .86 .36 .02 2.37 [1.16, 4.83] 
Italyb 1.20 .47 .01 3.30 [1.32, 8.29] 
Lithuaniab 1.13 .35 .001 3.09 [1.56, 6.13] 
Portugalb 1.80 .54 .001 6.05 [2.12, 
17.29] 
Spainb .31 .31 .32 1.36 [.74, 2.52] 
Switzerlandb .15 .60 .80 1.17 [.36, 3.75] 
UKb 1.36 .36 <.001 3.90 [1.95, 7.83] 
North America      
Mexicob .57 .43 .18 1.77 [.77, 4.08] 
USAb 1.35 .41 .001 3.87 [1.75, 8.57] 
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South America      
Brazilb 1.38 .47 .004 3.95 [1.56, 
10.01] 
Colombiab 1.06 .46 .02 2.88 [1.18, 7.02] 
Middle East      
Iranb -.11 .35 .75 .90 [.45, 1.77] 
Israel (Bedouins)b -1.42 .85 .10 .24 [.05, 1.28] 
Israel (Jews)b .85 .47 .07 2.33 [.93, 5.83] 
Lebanonb .04 .40 .93 1.04 [.48, 2.26] 
Asia      
Chinab 1.76 .42 <.001 5.82 [2.56, 
13.21] 
Hong Kongb .75 .51 .15 2.11 [.77, 5.76] 
Indiab -.23 .42 .57 .79 [.35, 1.78] 
Indonesiab .23 .38 .55 1.26 [.59, 2.67] 
Japanb .47 .34 .17 1.60 [.82, 3.11] 
Mongoliab 2.12 .79 .01 8.30 [1.77, 
30.01] 
South Koreab 1.54 .46 .001 4.64 [1.88, 
11.46] 
      
Disjunctive 
thinkingc 
.09 .16 .56 1.10 [.81, 1.49] 
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CRT (=1)d .43 .17 .012 1.54 [1.10, 2.16] 
CRT (=2) d 1.02 .21 <.001 2.76 [1.84, 4.15] 
CRT (=3) d 1.07 .22 <.001 2.92 [1.88, 4.53] 
NFC .28 .13 .03 1.33 [1.03, 1.71] 
NFS .003 .01 .80 1.003 [.98, 1.02] 
Extraversion -.08 .05 .11 .93 [.84, 1.02] 
Agreeableness .08 .07 .24 1.08 [.95, 1.23] 
Conscientiousness -.14 .06 .03 .87 [.76, .98] 
Emotional 
stability 
-.21 .06 <.001 .81 [.72, .90] 
Openness to 
experience 
.16 .07 .02 1.17 [1.02, 1.34] 
Table 5: Logistic regression results for Knowledge 2 for confidence ≥ 66 (a: reference 
class – males; b: reference class - France; c: reference class – correct answer; d: reference 
class - CRT score = 0) 
 
 Of the variables introduced in the regression model, age, site, CRT, NFC, 
emotional stability, openness to experience, and conscientiousness significantly predict 
people’s answers to Knowledge 2. Compared to the answers given in France, people in 
11 countries are more likely to share the Gettier intuition: Bulgaria, Germany, Italy, 
Lithuania, Portugal, UK, USA, Brazil, Colombia, China, Mongolia, and South Korea. 
Compared to people with a CRT score equal to 0, people with a CRT score equal to 2 and 
3 are more likely to share the Gettier intuition. Finally, conscientious people are less 
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likely to share the Gettier intuition, while people open to experience and neurotic people 
are more likely to share the Gettier intuition. These results are very similar to those 
obtained with all participants. 
 Figure 2 reports the percentages of Gettier intuition for Knowledge 1 and 
Knowledge 2 for our 24 sites (N=2228 for Knowledge 1 and N=2221 for Knowledge 2).  
 
Figure 2: Proportion of Gettier intuitions across the 24 sites for Knowledge 1 and 
Knowledge 2 
 
Table 6 reports whether for each site the proportion of Gettier intuition in response to 
Knowledge 1 and Knowledge 2 is significantly different from 50%. 
Site Knowledge 1 Knowledge 2 
N p N p 
Europe     
Bulgaria 155 .23 155 <.001 
France 178 .003 177 <.001 
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Germany 87 .92 88 <.001 
Italy 90 <.001 90 <.001 
Lithuania 154 .33 154 <.001 
Portugal 73 .003 73 <.001 
Spain 116 .58 114 <.001 
Switzerland 26 .70 26 .006 
UK 119 <.001 117 <.001 
North America     
Mexico 64 .05 64 <.001 
USA 116 .02 116 <.001 
South America     
Brazil 61 .001 61 <.001 
Colombia 50 .78 50 <.001 
Middle East     
Iran 90 .02 90 <.001 
Israel (Bedouins) 21 <.001 19 .11 
Israel (Jews)  70 .06 70 <.001 
Lebanon 79 .002 79 <.001 
Asia     
China 196 <.001 196 <.001 
Hong Kong 72 .06 72 <.001 
India 86 .52 86 <.001 
Indonesia 73 .73 73 <.001 
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Japan 146 .14 146 <.001 
Mongolia 33 .38 32 <.001 
South Korea 73 <.001 73 <.001 
Table 6: P-values of chi-square tests for Knowledge 1 and Knowledge 2 for each of the 
24 sites 
Answers to Knowledge 1 differ from 50% in only 11 of the 24 sites, and in one of them 
only a minority of people report the Gettier intuition when probed by means of 
Knowledge 1 (Israel: Bedouins). In all sites, except for the Bedouins of Israel, the 
answers to Knowledge 2 are significantly larger than 50%: A majority of people share the 
Gettier intuition in 23 of the 24 sites.  
 Figure 3 reports the percentages of Gettier intuition for Knowledge 1 and 
Knowledge 2 across gender, aggregating across sites (N=2218 for Knowledge 1 and 
N=2211 for Knowledge 2).  
 
Figure 3: Proportion of Gettier intuitions for Men and Women for Knowledge 1 and 
Knowledge 2 
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Figure 4 does the same thing for the 4 levels of the CRT scale (N=2184 for Knowledge 1 
and N=2178 for Knowledge 2). 
 
Figure 4: Proportion of Gettier intuitions for the four CRT scores for Knowledge 1 and 
Knowledge 2 
 
3. Discussion 
3.1 Cultural Variation 
We found that for 23 out of 24 sites and 16 out of 17 languages a large majority of people 
report  the Gettier intuition when it is probed by means of a question contrasting 
“knowing” and “thinking one knows, but not actually knowing” (Knowledge 2). In all 
these sites between approximately 70 and 90% of participants report  the Gettier intuition 
(Figure 2). Our sample of sites is diverse in various respects. Participants in many sites 
were not students. One of our sites examines a non-industrialized society: In Colombia, 
the data were collected from the Nasa People, three fourths of whom report  the Gettier 
intuition. The only exception to this pattern was the Bedouins in Israel. While the 
Bedouin data may be a counterexample to the claim that the Gettier intuition is universal, 
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we advise readers to interpret it with caution mostly because our sample size is very 
small. (In fact, it is even the smallest of all the samples in our study.) At the very least, a 
replication is called for before drawing any strong conclusion. In the meantime, we view 
our results as providing convergent evidence in support of the claim made in Machery et 
al. (forthcoming a): The Gettier intuition is robust across cultures and languages, 
suggesting that it is part of a core epistemology.  
 Answers to Knowledge 1 are more difficult to interpret. Out of 25 sites, they were 
significantly below 50% in 5 sites (France, Italy, Lebanon, Iran, and among the Bedouins 
of Israel) and significantly above 50% in 8 sites (Portugal, UK, USA, Mexico, Brazil, 
China, Hong Kong, and South Korea). No clear geographical or linguistic pattern 
emerges from this data. These findings show that “to know” and its standard translations 
are often used in a way that does not fit philosophers’ consensus that knowledge requires 
more than having a justified true belief, even if people may well have the Gettier 
intuition.  
 
3.2 Gender Variation 
In a provocative, widely discussed essay, Buckwalter and Stich (2014) provided 
suggestive evidence that judgments elicited by at least some philosophical cases vary 
across genders, and they speculated that such variation partly explains the gender 
imbalance in American professional philosophy. Buckwalter and Stich’s hypothesis has 
been criticized along two different lines. Assuming for the sake of the argument the 
reality of gender variation in philosophical judgments, some have argued that it was 
unlikely to explain the gender imbalance in philosophy (Antony, 2012; Thompson, 
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forthcoming). Others have rather focused on the evidential basis of Buckwalter and 
Stich’s hypothesis. Adleberg and colleagues (2015), Seyedsayamdost (2015), and 
Holtzman (2016) have examined some of the gender differences reported by Buckwalter 
and Stich, and they have been unable to replicate them.  
 The Gettier case has played an important role in this controversy since Stich and 
Buckwalter’s research was inspired by reports that men and women react differently to 
this case. Adleberg and colleagues as well as Seyedsayamdost failed to find any 
difference in Gettier cases, but their sample sizes are not large (respectively, N=136 and 
N=105, 137, and 78) and their studies were limited to English-speaking subjects. The 
results reported in this article are more compelling. With more than 2,000 participants, 
we failed to find any difference between men and women (Figure 3). We conclude that 
the Gettier case does not elicit different judgments from men and women. This finding is 
consistent with the existence of gender variation for other cases in philosophy (for gender 
variation in moral judgment, see Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015).  
 
3.3 Personality Variation 
Feltz and Cokely (2009, 2012, 2013) have argued that personality influences the 
judgments elicited by philosophical cases (see also Holtzman, 2013). For instance, they 
have shown that extraversion influences people’s judgments about cases assessing the 
compatibility of free will and responsibility with determinism (Feltz & Cokely, 2009). 
Some of their results have however been empirically challenged. In particular, 
Nadelhoffer, Kvaran, and Nahmias (2009) were unable to find widespread influence of 
extraversion on free will judgment, although they report some significant effects for 
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responsibility judgments. A second worry is that personality effects may be rare, or 
limited to the domains of ethics and action theory. A third worry is that such effects are 
very small and insignificant from a philosophical point of view.   
 Our findings support Feltz and Cokely’s contention that personality influences the 
judgments elicited by philosophical cases, extending the evidential basis beyond cases 
bearing on free will and responsibility. Conscientiousness correlated negatively with 
holding the Gettier intuition in all the analyses we reported above. Neuroticism and 
openness to experience correlated positively with reporting the Gettier intuition as 
measured by Knowledge 2 in our two analyses (Tables 3 and 5). The correlation between 
openness to experience and reporting the Gettier intuition replicates the results reported 
by Holtzman (2013). Roughly, conscientiousness measures the disposition for self-
discipline and reliability; neuroticism (the inverse of emotional stability) the tendency to 
experience negative emotion; and openness to experience the tendency to seek new 
experiences and engage in creative ventures. Admittedly, it is not clear at all why these 
dimensions of human personality positively or negatively correlate with endorsing the 
Gettier intuition. 
 Our findings also show that personality can have a substantial effect. The odds 
ratio for conscientiousness was between .84 and .89, meaning that the ratio P(Gettier 
intuition | Conscientiousness = x) / P(no Gettier intuition | Conscientiousness = x) 
decreases by 10% to 15% for a 1-point increase in conscientiousness (on a 7-point scale). 
The influence of neuroticism and openness to experience on answers to Knowledge 2 is 
of a similar size. Assuming an odds ratio of .85, this means that if people who are low in 
conscientiousness (Conscientiousness=1 on the TIPI) are equally likely to report and 
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reject the Gettier intuition, people high in conscientiousness (Conscientiousness=7 on the 
TIPI) are about three times less likely to report the Gettier intuition than to reject it, a 
striking difference (mutatis mutandis for neuroticism and openness to experience). Or to 
illustrate the effect size differently, assuming that 80% of people low on 
conscientiousness report the Gettier intuition, about 60% of people high on 
conscientiousness would report the Gettier intuition. 
 We conclude that personality matters when it comes to judgments in response to 
philosophical cases, as was already argued by James (1907). Furthermore, this finding 
matters philosophically (Feltz & Cokely, 2012; Machery, forthcoming). The influence of 
personality is hard to make sense of, as was noted earlier, and it is difficult to know why 
the judgments of conscientious people or those of people open to experience should be 
preferred to those of people who are less conscientious or less open to experience. But if 
we have no reason to prefer the judgment of one group to the judgment of another group, 
then we ought to suspend judgment.  
 
3.4 Age 
Colaço, Buckwalter, Stich, and Machery (2014) reported that age influences the 
judgments elicited by fake-barn cases, but this result has not been replicated. Our results 
tentatively suggest that age also influences the Gettier intuition, at least when one 
examines confident answers: Older people are less likely to report the Gettier intuition for 
both ways of eliciting this intuition (Knowledge 1 and Knowledge 2). The odds ratio is 
about .99, meaning that the ratio P(Gettier intuition | Age = x) / P(no Gettier intuition | 
Age = x) decreases by 1% for a 1-year increase in participants’ age. Here is one way to 
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illustrate this effect size: It means that assuming that 80% of 18-year olds report the 
Gettier intuition, only about 66% of 78-year olds would report the Gettier intuition, a 
noticeable difference.  
 
3.5 Reflection 
Critics of experimental philosophy have often run versions of the following argument 
(e.g., Ludwig, 2007; Kauppinen, 2007; Bengson, 2013): When they consider cases, 
philosophers are only interested in judgments generated by careful reflection about the 
cases themselves and the concepts philosophers deploy in response to these cases, and 
whatever it is that experimental philosophers have been studying, they have not been 
studying those kinds of things. Thus, experimental studies revealing that unreflective 
judgments are susceptible to a host of irrelevant factors do nothing to disqualify reflective 
judgments from playing a role in philosophical argumentation. Following Colaço et al. 
(ms) and Machery (forthcoming), we can call this argument “the reflection defense.” 
Previous work has failed to find any evidence that reflection has any influence on 
philosophical judgment (Weinberg et al., 2012; Gerken and Beebe, 2016; Colaço et al., 
ms), but only a few cases have been examined. The study reported above extends the 
assessment of the reflection defense in a new direction. 
 The notion of a reflective judgment is often left vague by proponents of the 
reflection defense, and it can be characterized in thicker or thinner terms. Here, we 
embrace a thin characterization of reflection, as was done in previous empirical work on 
the reflection defense: A judgment is thinly reflective just in case it results from a 
deliberation process involving attention, focus, cognitive effort, and so on—the type of 
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domain-general psychological resources that careful and attentive thinking requires—and 
unreflective otherwise. We examined the possible effect of reflection by looking at 
people’s disposition to engage in reflection, using the CRT (as was done in Livengood, 
Sytsma, Feltz, Scheines, & Machery, 2010) and the NFC scale as our measures.  
 In contrast to previous empirical work, we found that the more reflective one is, 
the more one is prone to give the standard philosophical answer in response to the Gettier 
case, namely that the agent does not know the relevant proposition (Figure 3), even after 
controlling for culture, age, gender, and other social-psychological measures. This is the 
case for both Knowledge 1 and Knowledge 2 for the CRT and for Knowledge 2 for the 
NFC scale. Furthermore, the effect size is noticeable. For instance, for people with a CRT 
score equal to 3 the ratio of the probability of holding the Gettier intuition to the 
probability of rejecting it is two to three times as large as it is for people with a CRT 
score equal to 0.  
 It isn’t entirely clear how to reconcile these findings with previous negative 
results. It isn’t that the disposition to engage in reflective thinking was measured 
differently in the present study from other studies since Gerken and Beebe (2016) also 
relied on the CRT and Colaço et al. also relied on the NFC scale. Nor is it the case that 
reflection matters for some domains but not others (epistemology perhaps, but not ethics) 
or for some cases but not others (the Gettier case, but not the truetemp case) since Colaço 
and colleagues failed to find any influence of reflection on epistemic cases, including a 
clock case.  
 Be it as it may, our results show that reflection can have a substantial impact on 
the judgments elicited by at least some cases. This finding is significant in two respects. 
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First, it provides some support to the reflection defense against the so-called negative 
program in experimental philosophy: It is sometimes too quick to challenge philosophical 
intuitions in light of their demographic variation and of framing effects since more 
reflective judgments could be universal and immune to framing effects. Proponents of the 
negative program should thus ensure that the demographic variation they observe or the 
framing effects they report don’t disappear once more reflective judgments are examined.  
 Second, the influence of reflection on the Gettier intuition suggests that people 
who do not report the Gettier intuition are making a performance error, reinforcing our 
claim that the Gettier intuition is part of a core epistemology. A performance error is a 
judgment that is not reflective of people’s domain-specific competence, but rather results 
from the characteristics of the processes needed to make this judgment. For instance, the 
judgment that a center embedded sentence like “The rat the cat the dog bit chased 
escaped” is not acceptable is a performance error because it does not reflect people’s 
grammatical competence but rather results from the processing limitations of working 
memory. Other types of sentences such as garden-path sentences elicit performance 
errors too. A garden-path sentence is grammatical, but sounds unacceptable because its 
beginning is similar to a salient syntactic construction and thus elicits an interpretation 
that ends up being incorrect. “The horse raced past the barn fell” and “The old man the 
boat” are classic examples of garden-path sentences. On reflection, however, competent 
speakers can see that such sentences are acceptable because they overcome the similarity 
between their beginning and the misleading syntactic constructions. We propose that 
something similar is happening with the Gettier case we used. In this case, the similarity 
between a case of genuine knowledge and the belief formed by the protagonist of the case 
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may lead some participants to judge that the protagonist knows the relevant proposition, 
but on reflection careful thinkers see that the similarity is merely superficial. The more 
reflective one is, as measured by the CRT, the less likely one is to follow one’s 
immediate reaction when making a judgment. If this analysis is correct, rejecting the 
Gettier intuition is a performance error that is overcome on reflection, exactly as is the 
case of our immediate reactions to garden-path sentences. 
 
Conclusion 
In this article we have presented a large-scale, cross-cultural, cross-linguistic study of the 
Gettier intuition. When the question is knowing vs. merely feeling one knows, we find 
that people share the Gettier intuition in a very diverse set of cultures and across many 
different languages. The Bedouin data may be an exception, but the data should be 
treated with circumspection. Men and women make the same judgment in response to a 
Gettier case. Age and personality have a noticeable effect on the Gettier intuition, as does 
people’s reflectivity.   
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